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Introduction
This thesis will compare the United States’ refugee policy in the Indochinese
refugee crisis with its policy in the ongoing refugee crises in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria.
From 1975 to 1997 the United States admitted 1,287,399 refugees for resettlement from
just three countries: Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos.1 These refugees fled in multiple
waves from the violence arising from the end of the wars in those three countries, and
from years of state repression, “re-education,” discrimination and genocide that occurred
after the communist victories in 1975.2 The resettlement of the many refugees from this
long-unfolding humanitarian crisis spanned five administrations from Ford to Clinton,
but most of the resettlement was done by the Ford, Carter and Reagan administrations.3
Over this period the United States was also an active participant in the formulation of and
execution of multilateral solutions to the refugee crisis, including the Orderly Departure
Program set up by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) which
saw would-be refugees leaving for resettlement directly from Vietnam instead of fleeing
dangerously.4
In contrast, the U.S. has resettled far fewer refugees from the countries where it
has become involved in the War on Terror. The country has admitted 14,947 refugees
from Afghanistan since 2002, 143,383 from Iraq since 2003, and 20,966 from Syria since

1

W. Courtland Robinson, Terms of Refuge: the Indochinese Exodus & the International Response, London:
Zed Books, 2000, 295.
2
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, The State of the World’s Refugees 2000: Fifty Years of
Humanitarian Action, Geneva, 1 January 2000, Accessed 1 February 2018, 82-101.
3
Linda Gordon, "Southeast Asian Refugee Migration” Center for Migration Studies Special Issues 5, no. 3
(May 1987): 156.
4
Judith Kumin, "Orderly Departure from Vietnam: Cold War Anomaly or Humanitarian
Innovation?" Refugee Survey Quarterly 27, no. 1 (January 01, 2008): 104-105. Accessed March 11, 2018.
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2011, for a total of 179,326 from all three countries.5 If this number is expanded to
include Special Immigrant Visa admissions, which is a visa category set up for Afghan
and Iraqi nationals who worked with U.S. military personnel and contractors, the number
rises to 246,729.6 Although the time periods are not yet the exact same length (16 ⅓ years
for Afghanistan, 15 ⅓ years for Iraq and 6 ⅓ for Syria vs. 22 years for the post-Vietnam
response period covered), the admissions numbers are still markedly lower for the War
on Terror countries than they were in the Indochina refugee crisis.
Why compare these two situations at all? Much has been made by the media of
the United States’ open-ended and still-ongoing military engagements in Afghanistan and
Iraq, and their supposed parallels to the Vietnam War. A simple Google search for
“Vietnam War Afghanistan Iraq” yields hundreds of hits discussing the similarities and
differences. While it is certainly true that no two historical events are exactly the same,
several factors serve to illustrate that the Vietnam War and the War on Terror
engagements do share several important parallels. The most commonly cited one is
length, as the Afghanistan War has passed Vietnam to become America’s longest foreign
war.7 Both conflicts were fought against insurgencies, though it is true that the Vietnam
War also featured a regular army opponent that was not present in Afghanistan or Iraq

5

United States Department of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration, Refugee Processing
Center, Refugee Admissions Report January 31, 2018, January 31, 2018, Accessed February 26, 2018.
6
United States Department of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration, Refugee Processing
Center, Cumulative Arrivals by State for Refugee and SIV - Afghan FY07 -FY17 as of February 26, 2018,
February 26, 2018, Accessed February 26, 2018; United States Department of State, Bureau of Population,
Refugees and Migration, Refugee Processing Center, Cumulative Arrivals by State for Refugee and SIV Iraqi FY07 -FY17 as of February 26, 2018, February 26, 2018, Accessed February 26, 2018; I have chosen
to consider Special Immigrant Visa recipients alongside refugees for Iraq and Afghanistan, because, though
they did not exist in the Indochinese crisis, they represent a class of persons who made up a significant
portion of the Indochinese evacuees: those linked to the U.S. military and government. I believe including
them makes the quantitative comparison more valid.
7
Adam Taylor, "These are America’s 9 longest foreign wars," The Washington Post, May 29, 2014,
Accessed March 13, 2018.
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(outside of the very initial stage of the 2003 Iraq invasion). More importantly, U.S.
military involvement was justified in each instance as a necessary step to curb the spread
of a dangerous ideology – communism in the case of Vietnam and Islamic terrorism in
the case of Afghanistan and Iraq. Furthermore, both Vietnam and the War on Terror
deployments have been viewed by the American public as a mistake, according to polling
data.8
Why include Syria alongside Iraq and Afghanistan in this comparison of policies?
Though it is true that the violence in Syria, and thus the refugee flows it has created, are
not completely the fault of the United States (though neither were the refugee flows postVietnam, or from Iraq or Afghanistan), U.S. involvement in the war has been significant.
The involvement of ISIS in the war is partly attributable to the United States’ invasion of
Iraq, which helped created the al-Qaeda insurgency in that country that eventually
morphed into ISIS.9 The U.S. has been involved in Syria since 2013, arming groups to
fight against ISIS and the Syrian government of Assad and performing airstrikes against
ISIS.10 The U.S. has also ramped up its efforts against the Syrian regime itself with
airstrikes on Syrian bases and U.S. troops on the ground. Secretary of State Tillerson
announced that this in an open-ended commitment to both combat terrorist groups and
ensure the downfall of the Assad regime.11 This demonstrates that Syria has become
something of a great power rivalry between the United States and Russia, who supports
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Frank Newport, "More Americans Now View Afghanistan War as a Mistake," Gallup, February 19, 2014,
Accessed March 13, 2018.
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Zachary Laub, "The Islamic State," Council on Foreign Relations, August 10, 2016, Accessed March 13,
2018.
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David Sanger, Eric Schmitt, and Ben Hubbard, "Trump Ends Covert Aid to Syrian Rebels Trying to
Topple Assad," The New York Times, July 19, 2017, Accessed March 13, 2018.
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Assad. The Vietnam War was also a great power proxy conflict in addition to a fight
against an ideology. This, combined with Syria’s connection to the Iraq invasion via ISIS,
justifies its inclusion in this comparison.
Taken together, the War on Terror conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria
comprise a protracted U.S. military and political campaign to contain a hostile ideology,
reduce the influence of rival powers, and build regimes favorable to its own interests.
This campaign takes place in an already embattled region with a complex history and
unique cultural tensions and dynamics, using both direct military assets and proxies. The
United States’ involvement in Vietnam can fit within this description as well, so an
analysis of the refugee crises attendant to the conflicts, and their respective responses,
can provide a useful look into U.S. policy and the conditions that motivate it.
To facilitate this side-by-side analysis, data on U.S. refugee resettlement has been
collected from UN retrospective reports and secondary sources (for the Indochinese
countries) and U.S. government published statistics (for the War on Terror countries). In
order to make these two situations more directly comparable, these raw statistics are
presented alongside other metrics, such as percentage of refugees created by each conflict
that were resettled by the U.S., and refugees resettled as a percentage of U.S. population.
This forms the quantitative comparison of the two cases. Alongside this numerical
approach, each policy will be contextualized and explained by examining primary
sources, such as speeches, statements, departmental reports, and State Department
communiques (where available), as well as secondary sources to understand the reasons
for and behind each of the policies. U.S. opinion polls on refugee resettlement will also

4

be considered. These two methods will elucidate the ways in which U.S. policy has been
similar and different in the two cases, and why that is so.
This research will be guided by three main questions. The first is, how exactly are
the policies different? This will be mostly achieved by the quantitative consideration of
the resettlement policies, with the appropriate manipulation of the variables to make the
two responses more comparable between time periods. The second question is, why was
each policy established in the way that it was, and what factors, particularly domestic and
international political ones, were most responsible for the formulation? This will be
answered with the consideration of primary and secondary works detailing the political
and foreign policy climate and considerations surrounding each scenario. It is likely this
comparison will shed more light on the differences between the Cold War and the War on
Terror, particularly their relative strengths in motivating such a hybrid of foreign and
domestic policy as refugee resettlement. The third question to be answered is, what
lessons can the Indochinese refugee response teach us about the current crisis? What
policies changes might the nation make in light of its historical ones?
The goal of this study is not only to determine how and why the United States
responded differently to these two refugee crises, but also to determine how to apply
lessons from the handling of the past crisis to the current one. To that end, this thesis will
conclude with policy recommendations for a future administration that will serve to
improve U.S. refugee policy, for these countries and generally, both to increase effective
implementation of U.S. foreign policy goals and address ongoing humanitarian crises.

5

Chapter 1: Indochinese Refugee Policy12

Prior to the 1973 ceasefire brokered by the U.S., the Vietnam War created
millions of internally displaced persons (IDPs) within South and North Vietnam, who
moved to the relatively safer urban areas. Some of these may actually be considered
refugees, since they moved from North to South Vietnam, or vice versa, but exactly how
many crossed the international border during the war is unknown. During the war there
was not significant movement outside of Vietnam by Vietnamese refugees, however. The
U.S government recognized this increase of IDPs but, despite its deep involvement in the
war, moved virtually none to safety in the United States. The only significant
immigration of Vietnamese to the U.S. before 1975 was that of war brides, who
numbered in the thousands.13 The U.S. also recognized that there would likely be political
refugees created in both North and South Vietnam as a result of the 1973 ceasefire.
However, a state department official told Congress in 1973 that he “did not anticipate
them coming to the United States…it would be our opinion that they could be resettled in
their own country.”14 U.S. admission of refugees from the Indochinese conflicts did not
start until after the fall of Saigon.
The first wave of refugee acceptances by the United States took place in 1975,
with 130,400 admitted, over 95 percent from Vietnam and most of the rest from

12

The U.S. Government only publishes U.S. refugee admissions data by region, not by country, for years
before 2001. In order to isolate data for the specific region under consideration, the data in this section is
compiled from a variety of sources, including scholarly articles from the period and retrospective UNHCR
reports and books. Data tables from these sources can be found in Appendix A.
13
David M Reimers, Still the Golden Door: The Third World Comes to America, New York: Columbia
University Press, 1992, 175.
14
United States Congress, House, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee No. 1, Western Hemisphere
Immigration, 93rd Cong., 1st sess., 1973, 105.
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Cambodia.15 These refugees were mostly “at-risk” individuals evacuated from Saigon
immediately during and after the fall of the city. They included Catholics, Buddhists,
government officials, landowners, and those who worked for the U.S. government, and
their families. Interestingly, the U.S. government actually intended the number evacuated
(and eventually resettled) from the south to be considerably higher, with President Ford’s
Interagency Task Force for Indochina recommending 197,000 Vietnamese to be
evacuated. Secretary of State Kissinger eventually ordered U.S. Ambassador to South
Vietnam Graham Martin on April 17th to evacuate 200,000. However, Martin was
stubborn and believed a last-minute deal with the North could be reached, so he did not
begin the main evacuation until twelve days later, leading to a lower number of refugees
evacuated and resettled than planned.16
An interesting subset of the 1975 evacuation was Operation Babylift. This U.S.
government operation airlifted 2,547 Vietnamese and Cambodian orphans for adoption in
the United States and other countries from April 3rd to April 26th.17 It was the brainchild
of Ambassador Martin who persuaded the head of the Vietnamese government to accept
the program, both so that Vietnam would gain sympathy in the U.S., and to show the rest
of the world Americans’ humanitarian ways. This evacuation was very popular with the
American public, as a poll found that 56 percent were in favor of the move with 32
percent opposed.18 The U.S. public did not extend its favor to the broader resettlement of
1975 evacuees, however. A poll conducted in May of that year showed 49 percent of

15

Gordon, "Southeast Asian Refugee Migration," 155.
Nghia M. Vo, Vietnamese Boat People, 1954 and 1975-1992, Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company,
2005, 64-65.
17
United States Agency for International Development. Operation Babylift Report (Emergency Movement
of Vietnamese and Cambodian Orphans for Intercountry Adoption, April - June 1975). Washington, DC.
Accessed March 13, 2018.
18
Reimers, Still the Golden Door, 176-177.
16
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Americans opposed to allowing the evacuees to stay, against 37 percent in favor and 14
percent unsure.19
The crisis was not confined to the immediate aftermath from the fall of Saigon,
however. In 1977, more refugees from Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos began to leave their
countries. This trickle would turn into a flood in 1978 and 1979. Vietnam forced over a
million people into “reeducation” camps and collectivized agriculture, which drove
hundreds of thousands to flee in boats to neighboring countries. Additional refugees fled
Cambodia’s genocidal Khmer Rouge regime and the Vietnamese invasion that dislodged
it. Ethnic minorities like the Hmong (who had fought for the United States against the
Communist Pathet Lao during the Vietnam War), along with landholders and farmers
dispossessed by Communist reforms, departed Laos.20
The United States responded to the growth of the crisis by stepping up to resettle
hundreds of thousands more refugees. From 1978 to 1985 the U.S. accepted and resettled
613,400 Indochinese refugees, including 352,800 Vietnamese, 137,800 Laotians, and
122,800 Cambodians.21 The U.S. government moved against popular opinion in these
later waves of resettlement. Sixty-two percent of Americans were opposed to the Carter
administration’s June 1979 announcement that it would resettle 14,000 Indochinese
refugees per month, but admissions went on despite this disapproval.22
As the 1980s wore on, the composition of refugees changed. This third wave
began to include unaccompanied minors sent by their families because of a lack of

19

Drew DeSilver, "U.S. Public Seldom Has Welcomed Refugees into Country," Pew Research Center,
November 19, 2015, Accessed April 02, 2018.
20
UNHCR, State of the World’s Refugees, 82-101.
21
Gordon, "Southeast Asian Refugee Migration,”155.
22
DeSilver, “U.S. Public Seldom Welcomed Refugees.”
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economic prospects, alongside the political dissidents and those connected to the former
regime that made up the earlier waves.23 UNHCR established new programs that were
more stringent in vetting refugees, and thus resettlements by the U.S. and other countries
declined through the 1980s and 1990s.24
Including the entire period of the crisis, from 1975 to 1997, the U.S. resettled
1,287,399 refugees from the region.25 Approximately 3 million refugees fled in total from
Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos in the same period. Of these, 2.5 million were eventually
resettled outside of the three countries concerned, while roughly half a million were
repatriated or returned, either voluntarily or involuntarily.26 This means the United States
resettled 43% of all the refugees that fled, and 51% of all the refugees that were
ultimately resettled somewhere. For further context, thr population of the United States in
1975 was 215,973,199.27 This means that the total number of resettled refugees, admitted
over twenty years, would have constituted 0.59% of the U.S.’s population in 1975. These
figures will be compared to their contemporary counterparts in the next chapter.
The very definition of refugee that the United States operated under at the
beginning of the Indochinese crisis was driven by foreign policy considerations. Congress
passed the Immigration and Nationality Act in 1965, which markedly departed from
America’s previous immigration policy. The new act abolished the system of national
origin quotas, instead setting up seven categories for immigrants that mostly focused on
family reunification and those with skills that would benefit the U.S. economy. The

23

Vo, The Vietnamese Boat People, 97-98.
UNHCR, State of the World’s Refugees, 101.
25
Robinson, Terms of Refuge, 295.
26
UNHCR, State of the World’s Refugees, 99.
27
"Historical National Population Estimates: July 1, 1900 to July 1, 1999," U.S. Census Bureau, June 28,
2000, Accessed February 3, 2018.
24
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seventh category was reserved for refugees, creating for the first time a permanent
refugee provision in U.S. immigration law.28 The Act defined refugees in a very
particular way, as those fleeing from “Communist or Communist-dominated” countries
or areas, or the general area of the Middle East, and were unable to return to their homes
because of race, religion, or political opinion.29 This definition was still in place in 1975
at the start of the Indochinese crisis. The 1965 statute was clearly driven by the
framework of Cold War politics and the constant need for America to outshine
communism in general and the Soviet Union in particular. This same framework was still
in place in 1975 when the crisis began, and remained a factor in the U.S. government’s
refugee policy for years.
The Ford administration certainly had its hands full in the spring of 1975. Besides
a lagging economy and the continuing fallout from the Watergate Scandal, Ford inherited
the problem of the Vietnam War from his predecessors. By 1975 it was becoming clear
that the ceasefire with the North would not hold. The North Vietnamese Army began
their offensive in January and had reached the outskirts of Saigon by April. As they
closed in on the city, the administration set up an Interagency Task Force for Indochina
Refugees on April 18th to evaluate the government’s options.30 Although the response
was delayed by personnel on the ground, the direct evacuation by the government and
subsequent naval pickup of thousands that had escaped in boats was still a decisive action
by the administration. This evacuation was done without direct Congressional
authorization (though they had been consulted, hard details were never agreed). In fact,

28

Reimers, Still the Golden Door, 80-81.
An Act to amend the Immigration and Nationality Act, and for other purposes, Public Law 89-236, U.S.
Statutes at Large 79 (1965): 913.
30
Robinson, Terms of Refuge, 18.
29
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by the time legislation was passed that allocated funds to pay for resettlement and
provided legal status for the refugees, the majority of them were already on U.S. soil.31
Ford had two main reasons for the 1975 evacuation and resettlement. The first
was a sense of duty and responsibility to the refugees. His executive order in May 1975
that established an Advisory Committee on the issue demonstrates this sense. He
described the refugees as those who “stood by America as an ally,” and argues that
Americans “must open [their] doors and [their] hearts.” He also hearkened back to
America’s history as a place of refuge for victims of persecution and intolerance.32 In this
statement he asserted America’s moral duty to both uphold its history as a haven, and its
duty to stand by its wartime allies.
Besides moral duty, Cold War political concerns motivated Ford’s claim that
America must accept the Vietnamese refugees and provide them a new home. In an
address to Congress, Ford reminded Americans of the Hungarian and Cuban refugees that
they had accepted in the preceding two decades. He likened these to the Vietnamese
evacuees, saying “Now, other refugees have fled from the Communist takeover in
Vietnam. These refugees chose freedom.”33 By linking the refugee admissions to
America’s wider struggle against Communism, he could justify the expenditure and effort
required to resettle and integrate these refugees into America.
Ford also believed that Indochinese refugee admissions could help America
recover its image as a benevolent nation after the Vietnam debacle. An incident that

31

Reimers, Still the Golden Door, 179.
Gerald Ford, “Executive Order 11860—Establishing the President's Advisory Committee on Refugees,”
Executive Order, Washington, DC, May 19, 1975.
33
Carl J. Bon Tempo, Americans at the Gate: the United States and Refugees during the Cold War,
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008, 147.
32
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occurred on Guam in the summer and fall of 1975 highlights this fact. Guam was one of
the staging areas for Indochinese refugees before permanent locations were found for
them. Here, around 1,600 evacuees claimed that they had been taken from Vietnam
against their will and demanded to be allowed to return. The administration initially tried
to stonewall their request, as the sight of evacuees returning to the Communist nation
would undercut the humanitarian image the U.S. wanted to cultivate with its resettlement
program. However, after some of the would-be repatriates received media attention by
beginning hunger strikes, and others set fire to buildings in a riot, the administration
folded and allowed them to use a former South Vietnamese merchant vessel to return
home. U.S. officials still attempted to manipulate media coverage surrounding the event,
however. Kissinger requested that coverage should emphasize the “basic humanitarian
nature of our effort.”34 The repatriation incident serves to demonstrate the importance the
Ford administration placed on Indochinese refugee resettlement as a means to rebuild
image and credibility.
President Carter’s term in office coincided with the second-wave surge of boat
people and land people refugees that began in 1977 and grew rapidly in the next two
years. The Carter administration’s response was to admit tens of thousands of
Indochinese unilaterally (and against the public’s wishes), but it also worked to involve
the rest of the world in managing the crisis. The administration’s response was tied to its
foreign policy, in ways both particular to Carter’s political priorities and to familiar Cold
War reasoning.

34

H. M Stur, ""Hiding Behind the Humanitarian Label": Refugees, Repatriates, and the Rebuilding of
America's Benevolent Image After the Vietnam War," Diplomatic History 39, no. 2 (2014): 223-225, 241.
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The violence and trauma of the Vietnam War, both overseas and at home in the
U.S., helped unravel the liberal consensus that America’s moral as well as strategic
imperative was to contain the spread of communism at all costs. Americans began to
question whether anti-communist intervention was effective, and if it had subverted the
nation’s values. This reflection led some to make calls for human rights to be a new
organizing principle in U.S. foreign policy. These calls found a champion in Jimmy
Carter, who incorporated them into his domestic and foreign policies, and promised to
have “a total commitment to the preservation of human rights, individual liberty, and
freedom of conscience.”35
The president’s generous refugee admissions policy can be viewed as part of his
framework of human rights promotion. Carter made this connection explicitly in a 1978
speech marking the 30th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. He
stated that “Refugees are the living, homeless casualties of one very important failure on
the part of the world to live by the principles of peace and human rights.” He goes on to
state Americans’ duty, both as humans and descendants of refugees, to accept them into
the country. The address continues to establish that “Human rights is the soul of our
foreign policy…because human rights is the soul of our sense of nationhood.”36 This link
from U.S. refugee resettlement policy to U.S. foreign policy, when presented in such
stark terms, demonstrates the importance the former had to the latter for the United
States. This connection is further borne out by State Department memos to the UN

35

Barbara J. Keys, Reclaiming American virtue: the human rights revolution of the 1970s, Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 2014, 51, 236.
36
Jimmy Carter, “Universal Declaration of Human Rights Remarks at a White House
Meeting Commemorating the 30th Anniversary of the Declaration's Signing,” Speech, Washington, DC,
December 6, 1978, The American Presidency Project.
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mission that emphasized the importance of the boat people crisis to the US and the UN’s
human rights work.37
Besides Carter’s focus on refugee resettlement as part of the nation’s human
rights promotion efforts, he also used traditional Cold War logic to justify Indochinese
refugee admissions. He believed the U.S. had a special responsibility to assist the boat
people due to the United States’ involvement in the Vietnam War that so deeply affected
all three countries. He also responded to criticism of refugee admissions by describing the
boat people as “persecuted by a Communist government in Vietnam, which has taken
away from them their basic rights.” This reassertion of anti-Communist rhetoric helped
win over conservatives and neo-conservatives, who in turn supported boat people
admissions.38 The Carter administration’s expert on Indochina, Richard Holbrooke, also
pointed to the pressure that the refugees were placing on ASEAN countries like Thailand
and Indonesia, allies that were important against Communism’s further spread.39 Even in
a supposed new era for U.S. foreign policy, Cold war logic was paramount and helped
make refugee resettlement less of a wedge issue.
Presidents Ford and Carter admitted these high numbers of refugees under the
“parole power” provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which allowed the
president to circumvent immigration quotas to admit foreigners in extraordinary cases.40
As Indochinese refugees continued to be admitted under this emergency measure,
Congress moved to normalize the process by passing the Refugee Act in 1980. It set a

37

United States Department of State, Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission in Geneva and
the Mission to the United Nations (September 7, 1978), Accessed January 31, 2018.
38
Bon Tempo, Americans at the Gate, 154.
39
Ibid, 153-54.
40
Cristina Rodriguez and Adam Cox, "The President and Immigration Law," Yale Law Journal 118, no. 4
(January 1, 2009): 501-504, Accessed April 6, 2018.
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refugee admissions ceiling of 50,000 per year, but allowed the president to increase it
after consultation with Congress. The Refugee Act also changed the definition of refugee
from the previous anti-Communist one, to include anyone outside their home country
with a “well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”41 This put the United
States in line with the UN’s language on refugee definition. The effects of this law were
not felt immediately, as President Reagan initially kept admissions ceilings high, but the
removal of the parole power has had an impact on future crises.
The Reagan administration, though it did not admit as many refugees from
Indochina as the Carter administration before it, still resettled tens of thousands per
year.42 Although Reagan did not place the same emphasis on international human rights
promotion as Carter did, he was a strident anti-Communist, and so the refugee policy’s
important role in foreign policy continued. Refugee resettlement as a component of
America’s image was even important enough to Reagan that it featured prominently in
his farewell address to the nation in 1989. Reagan told the story of an Indochinese child
who, when pulled from the sea by a Navy sailor, said “Hello American Sailor. Hello,
freedom man.”43 Reagan then used this image of America helping a refugee to represent
America’s broader mission of standing for freedom and leadership in the world.
Besides its own resettlement initiatives, the United States was very involved in
the process of finding international solutions to the Indochinese refugee crisis. President
Carter, at a June 1979 meeting of the G7, was able to convince each of the members to

41

Bon Tempo, Americans at the Gate, 177-178.
Gordon, "Southeast Asian Refugee Migration," 156.
43
Reagan, Ronald. “Farewell Address to the Nation.” Speech, Washington, DC, January 11, 1989. The
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increase funding for UNHCR’s budget and to resettle more refugees. He did this by
leading from the front, with an announcement that the U.S. would increase its monthly
resettlement to 14,000 refugees, in order to pressure other nations to contribute more.44
The U.S. also sent vice-president Walter Mondale to chair UNHCR’s 1979 international
conference of 65 countries on the crisis, whose solutions involved countries of origin,
countries of first asylum and countries of resettlement working together.45 Later, the
United States was also a member of the 1989 Comprehensive Plan of Action, which
introduced stricter refugee status determination alongside another push for resettlement in
a bid to end the long crisis.46
One specific international program in which the U.S. had a heavy hand is worth
discussing: the Orderly Departure Program (ODP). This innovative program, which
began in 1979, allowed would-be refugees to apply for resettlement from Vietnam, rather
than leave their homes on a dangerous sea journey to become official refugees. Over
650,000 Vietnamese were resettled to various countries through the ODP.47 458,367 of
these came to the United States.48 Although it was officially set up by UNHCR, the U.S.
government pushed the agency to develop the program so that it could work for U.S.
interests. (Since the U.S. had no diplomatic relations with Vietnam, they could not play a
direct role in the process). The ODP was used by the U.S. government to both reduce the
number of refugees leaving the country (and thus help Vietnam’s neighboring countries,
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Robinson, Terms of Refuge, 53-54.
46
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U.S. allies), and to secure from Vietnam those of concern to the United States, including
family members of U.S. citizens and former U.S. government employees.49
The United States pursued an active and decisive policy of resettlement of
Indochinese refugees during the crisis. This was primarily an executive branch activity,
with Congress following behind with funding and legalization of status resolutions,
which led to the 1980 Refugee Act that formalized the process. Refugee resettlement
policy was used as a component of foreign policy, in order to assist U.S. allies in the
region and to rebuild America’s benevolent image after the Vietnam War. Cold War
politics also played a huge role in motivating the policy. The U.S. participated in, and in
some cases spearheaded, multilateral solutions to the crisis.
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Chapter 2: War on Terror Refugee Policy

The refugee flows emanating from Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria cannot be as
neatly divided as the three phases that came from Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. While
not all geographically or temporally contiguous, the refugee crises are all linked by U.S.
involvement in the countries that spawned them, involvement that was and is
controversial and not particularly successful in achieving American aims (as was the case
in Southeast Asia).
America’s long involvement in the War on Terror began in Afghanistan, which
the U.S. invaded in 2001 to dislodge the Taliban government that was sheltering Al
Qaeda. The United States, along with its NATO allies, established military bases and
attempted to rebuild the country as a democracy, but has ended up fighting a Taliban
insurgency since the invasion that lasts to this day. Seventeen years on from the initial
invasion, the Taliban completely controls or is openly active in 70 percent of the
country.50
The conflict has created large numbers of refugees and IDPs, though these
numbers have fluctuated greatly with the conflict and many of both are unregistered,
making analysis difficult. However, UNHCR reports that there were 3.6 million refugees
outside Afghanistan before the invasion, and that there are currently 2.8 million located
outside the country.51,52 While these statistics seem positive on their face, this reduction
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of refugees is due not to resettlement but repatriation. This repatriation has been at times
voluntary and at times coerced by Afghanistan’s neighbors.53 These Afghan refugees
have been forced to return to a country that is still not safe by most measures, which has
caused the IDP population to more than double during the long war, so it is hard to
defend this repatriation as a “win.”54 Seventy-two percent of refugees who have returned
have been subsequently displaced at least twice by continuing violence.55
The United States justified its 2003 invasion of Iraq in part by claiming that
Saddam Hussein was harboring and supporting al-Qaeda, making the invasion part of the
campaign to contain terrorism. The U.S. achieved its initial war aim of removing the
Ba’athist government from power quickly, but the subsequent process of nation-building
proved much more difficult, as in Afghanistan. The dismantling of the existing state and
military led to the rise of an insurgency that al-Qaeda used to gain a foothold in the
country it did not have previously. The invasion also unleashed sectarian tensions that
erupted in violence between Sunnis, Shi’ites and religious minorities.56
As in Afghanistan, many fled the country to escape the violence while many
others were displaced within the country. UNHCR reported that there were
approximately 400,000 Iraqi refugees worldwide before the U.S. invasion, but by 2008
that figure had risen to 2.4 million.57,58 This was accompanied by the creation of 2.7
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million IDPs over the same period.59 The United States withdrew its combat forces in
2011, but violence and refugee flows would continue. ISIS, which traces its lineage to the
post-invasion insurgency, embarked on a campaign of bombings, territory seizure and
ethnic cleansing beginning in 2014. This has prompted over 260,000 refugees to flee to
neighboring countries.60
For the United States, the Syrian Civil War has become both an anti-terror
conflict and a proxy conflict against rivals. The civil war began in 2011 with popular
protests that were part of the Arab Spring, but Islamic terror groups including ISIS have
contributed significantly to the carnage. Meanwhile, U.S. rivals Iran and Russia have
supported the Assad regime throughout the conflict. American military involvement
began solely to combat ISIS and other jihadist groups, but has now been expanded to
directly challenge the Assad regime (and by extension, its foreign supporters). The
humanitarian costs of the conflict have been astronomical, however. After seven years of
war, more than 5.6 million Syrians are registered refugees (although the true number is
probably higher, since Lebanon has banned refugee registration since 2015). 4.1 million
of these have come since 2013, when the U.S. entered the conflict by arming and funding
resistance fighters. On top of the refugees, the Syria conflict has created 6.5 million
IDPs.61
The numbers of refugees the U.S. has admitted from these protracted conflicts has
been a small proportion of their total numbers. In Afghanistan, the United States has
resettled 14,947 refugees from FY 2002-2018. It has also admitted around three times as
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many Afghans as Special Immigrant Visa holders, 49,170 in total. From Iraq, the United
States has resettled a much higher number of refugees, 143,383 since 2003, while
admitting 18,167 on SIVs. Syria has seen far fewer refugees admitted to America, with
only 21,062 since the start of the civil war (21,002 since 2013).62
In relative terms, this is far less than the U.S. took in during the Indochinese
crisis. Iraqi refugees resettled by the United States as a percentage of the total Iraqi
refugee population is 6.34 percent, which rises to 7.14 percent if SIVs are included. For
Syria, the same figure is 0.37 percent. These figures are certainly smaller than the 43
percent share from the Indochinese crisis. As a proportion of U.S. population, the total
refugee and SIV admissions (246,729) for the three countries for the period covered is
0.09% (using 2001 as the base year).63 The corresponding figure for the Indochinese
response was 0.59%.
The terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001 had a huge impact on the Bush
administration’s refugee policy towards Afghanistan and Iraq. In the immediate wake of
the tragedy, the president ordered the entire refugee admissions program suspended for
more than two months. This included canceling admissions for refugees that had already
made it through the lengthy approval process.64 After the freeze, the State Department
implemented stricter security checks to supplement the admissions process.65 This was an
understandable and justified change to the process, given the traumatic nature of 9/11.
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However, after refugee admissions resumed, they were at much lower levels than
they had been before 9/11. The Bush administration set its admissions ceiling at 70,000
for 2002 and kept it there through 2007, raising it to 80,000 in 2008. However, the nation
admitted significantly fewer than that in each of those years.66 Very few refugees were
admitted from Afghanistan and Iraq during these years, even as they began to pour out of
Iraq following the instability caused by the invasion. President Bush did mention
refugees in several statements and speeches, but it was usually to illustrate the evil
regimes that were creating them. In his 2003 State of the Union he related stories of
Saddam Hussein’s regime that came from refugees as part of his justification for the
coming invasion.67 Congress also authorized the Special Immigrant Visa Program during
Bush’s tenure, which was intended to reward Iraqis and Afghans who assisted the U.S.
government in its mission.
President Obama inherited the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars from the Bush
administration in 2009, along with their refugee and IDP situations. His administration
markedly increased refugee admissions of Iraqis, keeping them near or above 10,000
annually throughout his entire tenure. His second term also saw a large surge in the
issuance of SIVs, which may have been due to U.S. withdrawal of troops from Iraq and a
drawdown in Afghanistan.
The refugee crisis in Syria also became an issue during the Obama administration,
and it responded slowly to this crisis. The U.S. admitted fewer than 2,000 refugees from
Syria in the first 5 years of the war, despite the fact that millions had fled, and the U.S.
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was a participant in the conflict. The president eventually pledged to take in 10,000
Syrians in 2016. Critics pointed out that European nations planned to accept far more,
and even Venezuela planned to accept 20,000.68 Paralleling their reactions in 1975 and
1979, the U.S. public opposed this plan, with sixty percent opposed and thirty-seven
percent in favor.69 The administration met this goal despite the criticism, and followed it
up with plans to increase the global admissions ceiling for 2017 from to 110,000. Obama
made this announcement in a speech at the United Nations, and called on the other
nations of the world to follow that example to increase resettlement.70 This attempt
echoes Jimmy Carter’s attempts in 1979 to use the U.S. as an example to inspire other
countries. This final policy change would prove to be mostly symbolic, however, as
Donald Trump’s victory in 2016 brought a drastic change to U.S. refugee policy.
Trump campaigned on a promise to cut U.S. refugee admissions, and those from
Syria specifically (after a brief period when he supported Syrian admissions as a
humanitarian measure). This was part of his wider promises to reduce U.S. immigration.
He even called Syrian refugees “a great Trojan Horse for the U.S.,” claiming they posed a
giant security risk in order to play off of many Americans’ continuing fears of
terrorism.71 Trump quickly delivered on this promise. One of his first actions as president
was the so-called “Muslim ban,” which blocked travel from seven Muslim-majority
nations, but also suspended all refugee admissions for 120 days and banned Syrian
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refugees indefinitely.72 This order, including the shunning of refugee admissions, drew
criticism from many countries, including America’s allies in Europe doing just the
opposite. Despite that original order being mostly blocked in the courts, Trump has
followed through on his promise to resettle fewer refugees, and especially fewer refugees
from Syria. At the same time, he has admitted record numbers of Special Immigrant Visa
holders. This may indicate the administration plans to stay strategically involved in Iraq
and Afghanistan, and needs to ensure it can continue to recruit local allies.
The United States’ has resettled fewer refugees from War on Terror related
countries than it did in the Indochinese crisis, both in absolute and relative terms. The
September 11th terrorist attacks brought a halt to all refugee admissions, and they did not
rise back to pre-2001 levels until the Obama administration. Although refugee admissions
were low, Congress did create the Special Immigrant Visa program to recruit and reward
local Iraqis and Afghans, using refugee-like policy as a component of foreign policy. The
Trump administration has continued the SIV program, but has been incredibly hostile to
not just the practice of but the concept of refugee resettlement, marking a dramatic shift
in U.S. policy.
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Chapter 3: Analysis

The legacy of America’s military failure in Southeast Asia weighed extremely
heavily on its subsequent refugee policy in the region. By the end of the Vietnam War,
Americans had come to grips with the idea that their involvement in the region was
unsuccessful, and the rapid collapse of South Vietnam confirmed this. The refugee crisis
itself arose (in part) because the United States failed in its goal of containing the
Communist regime in North Vietnam and would-be regimes in Laos and Cambodia.
When the refugees began to flow out of the region, the United States accepted so many of
them because it had accepted that its military and political vision for the region had lost
out. As noted, the United States did not admit any refugees from the region prior to South
Vietnam’s final defeat in 1975 (admittedly most of the millions displaced during the war
were technically not refugees, but IDPs). To do so would have been to admit that
America and its non-communist allies were losing.
This is the biggest reason for the differing response to the refugee crises in
Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria. As the United States is still in the midst of its War on Terror
engagements in these countries, an acceptance of refugees on the scale seen post-Vietnam
would be a recognition that America is not creating the safe, stable, terrorism-free
democracies that it has aimed to create. This is especially true of the Bush administration,
who began the Iraq and Afghanistan engagements, and resettled very few refugees even
when the situation became dire, preferring to rely on dubiously effective repatriation. As
the United States continues its long-running engagement in the region, the changing
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perception of its political and military success or failure will likely have a bearing on its
refugee resettlement policy, just as it did in Southeast Asia.
Another very important reason for the difference between the policies is the
nature of the Cold War versus the War on Terror. The Cold War, though far from a
moment of perfect agreement in American politics, did provide a measure of consensus in
U.S. foreign policy. Linking a policy to the struggle against Communism provided a
ready avenue to help it gain political, if not always popular, support. The Cold War
dynamic also required the United States to work closely with allies and attend at least
somewhat to their interests, and to pursue multilateral solutions to its problems, which
was reflected in the response to the Indochinese crisis. The War on Terror, though also a
struggle against an ideology deemed dangerous to America and the world, has not
provided the same sort of political consensus at home. As a result, there has not been
similar support for Middle Eastern refugees, even though they can be seen as victims of
that same ideology. The United States has also become comparatively more unilateral in
its global dealings since the end of the Cold War (e.g. the 2003 invasion of Iraq that was
widely criticized by many U.S. allies). This unilateralism has manifested itself in the
relative paucity of refugee crisis solutions spearheaded or supported by the U.S. in the
War on Terror.
It must also be acknowledged that the statutory environment surrounding U.S.
refugee resettlement has also changed, in part due to the experience of the Indochinese
crisis. Gone are the days of widespread parole power admissions and ad-hoc policy.
However, even under the 1980 legal framework of the admissions ceiling and
consultation with Congress, the United States still pursued an active resettlement policy
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and admissions numbers stayed high, at least for a time. The Reagan administration
resettled 160,000 refugees in 1981 and around 100,000 in 1982, the majority of whom
were from Indochina.73 Thus, the legal environment, though different, is only a small part
of the reason for the differing policies. Far more important to our understanding of the
differing responses is the United States’ appraisal of its strategic success (or lack thereof)
in each situation, and the nature of the Cold War and the War on Terror as political
unifiers.
Yet despite the fact that several factors have combined to create a different policy
today than the U.S. employed in the Indochinese crisis, there are still lessons to be
learned from the United States’ past experience. The next chapter will discuss policy
changes that the U.S. can enact to improve its implementation of foreign policy goals,
revive its image, gather domestic support for resettlement, and better respond to
humanitarian needs.
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Chapter 4: Policy Recommendations

The first, most urgent policy recommendation is directed at the current
administration. President Trump has set the FY 2018 refugee admissions ceiling at
45,000, with 17,500 of those allocated to the Near East/South Asia region that includes
the countries discussed in this paper.74 This is the lowest the ceiling has ever been set,
dating back to the 1980 passage of the Refugee Act which established the requirement.75
However, the administration is on track to admit less than half that number, based on
admissions from the first quarter of FY 2018.76 This markedly diminished rate comes at a
time when the number of forcibly displaced people worldwide has never been higher.77
The United States has previously used its position as global resettlement leader to
pressure other countries into action.78 Now, with the nation on track to admit only 21,000
refugees from across the globe this year, America risks losing this status. Trump’s slogan
may be “America First,” but this is one position where America may no longer be
number one. The Trump administration should move to at least admit as many refugees
as the ceiling will allow.
It seems unlikely that the current administration will consider raising the refugee
ceiling after slashing it so drastically. However, a future administration can and should
raise it once again. There are obvious humanitarian arguments for increased U.S.
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resettlement. But besides these, a future administration should cast resettlement in foreign
policy terms to convince Congress and the American public of the necessity of increased
admissions. Increasing resettlement could help the U.S. repair relations with allies
experiencing refugee flows, and also help the country rebuild its international image in
the wake of its unpopular War on Terror involvement. Both of these methods of
reasoning were used to justify America’s resettlement of the Indochinese in the 1970s
and 80s, but could also prove useful in America’s current geopolitical situation.
Turkey is a prime candidate for this first type of benefit from increased
resettlement. It currently houses over 3.5 million refugees from the Syria conflict, and the
International Organization for Migration reports that social cohesion is diminishing as
tensions rise between the refugees and their Turkish hosts.79 At the same time, AmericanTurkish relations are at a nadir because Turkey claims the U.S. abetted an unsuccessful
coup attempt in 2016, and the U.S. is supporting Kurdish fighters in Syria that Turkey
claims are terrorists. American officials say that relations are at a “crisis point.”80 If the
U.S. were to focus on resettling Syrian refugees from Turkish camps, it would help
relieve pressure on Turkey’s government, and could be a step toward repairing relations
between the countries.
The European Union has also seen a flood of asylum seekers petitioning for
refugee status in the last three years. Over 3.1 million new applicants filed for this status
from 2015-2017, and the top three countries of origin for these would-be refugees were
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Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan.81 Contemporaneously, U.S.-European relations have become
strained as President Trump rails against what he sees as unfair trade practices and an
unfair level of contribution to European defense. The transatlantic relationship that has
underpinned the postwar order is said to be fraying. Besides the prognostications of
analysts, multiple polls describe this damaged relationship.82 However, one way the
United States could rebuild Europeans’ goodwill would be admitting asylum seekers to
the U.S. from the EU once their status is determined. That way, the U.S. would be seen as
shouldering some of the burden that its allies, by virtue of their proximity to the Middle
East, are feeling that the U.S. is not. If U.S. authorities can accept the validity of
European procedures to determine refugee status, it will even save the government time
and resources in the admissions process.
Besides reassuring individual allies of its continuing commitment to their
interests, increased refugee resettlement would help America improve its global image
that has been damaged by its involvement in the War on Terror. Several of America’s
strategies of prosecuting the war, from its use of “enhanced interrogation” and black
sites, to its increasingly widespread drone bombing campaign, have proved very
unpopular with publics across the globe. This has translated to a loss of confidence in the
U.S. as a whole, an effect that was most pronounced during the Bush years but still
present during the Obama administration.83 A future administration could use the
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increased resettlement of refugees from War on Terror conflict zones to shore up the
image of the U.S. as a protector of freedom and human rights, in a similar way the Ford
and Carter administrations used Indochinese refugee resettlement to rebuild America’s
image after Vietnam.
The American public’s opposition to refugee resettlement often stems from two
worries: that they will be an economic drag or a security risk. However, research has
shown quite the opposite to be true. The National Bureau of Economic Research has
found that refugees work at higher rates than natives, and that they contribute more in
taxes than they receive in public assistance in the long term.84 The Federal Reserve
reports that immigrants, especially refugees, have a much higher success rate when
starting their own businesses.85 Here too the legacy of the Indochinese refugee policy can
be illustrative. Research has found that Vietnamese immigrants (composed almost
entirely of resettled refugees and their family members who entered later under the
family-unification category), have higher incomes and are less likely to live in poverty
than the native-born population.86 Security concerns, of particular importance in the age
of the War on Terror, are also overblown. The CATO Institute has found that the odds of
an American dying in a terror attack by a refugee is 1 in 3.64 billion per year. All three of
these deaths occurred before the 1980 Refugee Act added more security checks to the
admissions process.87 Should a future administration decide to increase its refugee
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admissions as recommended, it should also institute a public information campaign to
inform the American public that refugees are not a security risk or an economic burden.
Statutory changes should accompany the increase of the admissions ceiling.
Under current U.S. immigration law (Section 209 of the Immigration and Nationality
Act), refugee status is only good for one year. All persons admitted to the U.S. as
refugees are required to apply to have their status adjusted to legal permanent resident
(LPR) after that time.88 This process means more work for the Department of Homeland
Security, which wastes time and money. The rigorous system now in place to vet
refugees before their admission has outstripped the admissions checks that were in place
in 1980, at the Refugee Act’s passage. Furthermore, the differences between the factors
that would cause a refugee to be denied adjustment to LPR status, and those that would
necessitate deportation of an LPR, have been mostly eliminated, rendering this status
adjustment process redundant.89 The U.S. government should amend the admissions
process to directly admit refugees as legal permanent residents. Removing the timeintensive extra step of LPR status adjustment would eliminate tens of thousands of filings
per year, freeing up some of the resources needed to process more resettlement
applications as discussed above. This change would also make life easier for the refugees
themselves.
One other policy that should be improved is the Special Immigrant Visa Program.
Despite the Trump administration continuing the trend of increasing SIV admissions,
there is still a large backlog in the program. Around 14,000 applicants (solely primary
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applicants, not including family members) are still waiting on the process, and there are
only 3,500 SIVs allotted for 2018.90 This is especially troubling as U.S. involvement
continues in both Iraq and Afghanistan, which means more Iraqis and Afghans will be
needed to serve as interpreters and contractors. In Afghanistan, the military plans to
increase its presence with more troops on the ground and more aircraft operations,
meaning those eligible to apply for SIVs will increase further.91 The tenuous position of
the SIV program does not bode well for the U.S.’ ability to recruit allies on the ground in
these countries, and thus to achieve its military and foreign policy goals. Furthermore, a
failure here will likely be remembered by potential allies in future conflicts, so there are
long-term ramifications. The U.S. Congress should immediately authorize more SIVs and
continue to do so until American involvement in the countries ends, and there are no
more valid applicants.
As the U.S. becomes more involved in the Syria conflict, Congress should
consider setting up an SIV program for Syria as well. Already there are U.S. troops in the
country, fighting both jihadist groups and pro-regime forces alongside local allies.
Though it is not known exactly what roles these U.S. troops are playing, it seems safe to
assume that they are utilizing local Syrians as guides and interpreters. As such, it appears
there is, or will be, a population of Syrians that would be threatened if they came under
the sway of the Syrian regime or jihadists. If such an event does come to pass, Congress
should authorize an SIV program for Syria. It does no good to operate and fully fund
such a program in one or two countries if it is not implemented in another situation where
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it is needed. However, the U.S. has also relied heavily on proxy fighters in its efforts
against ISIS and the regime. These Syrians, even if they did not work directly for
Americans as interpreters, would still be threatened and might wish to flee in the event of
a regime victory. To maintain credibility with current and future allies, Congress should
consider extending SIV eligibility to those fighters funded by or receiving supplies from
the U.S. and fighting on its behalf.
The U.S. can look to its admissions and successful integration of over a million
Vietnamese, Cambodian and Laotians as a high point for its engagement with the world
and its promotion of human rights and humanitarian assistance. With carefully crafted
policies that would assist implementation of America’s foreign policy objectives, rebuild
its image, and streamline its process of refugee admissions without endangering its
security or economy, that high point can happen again.

34

Appendix A
92

Chart 1

92

Gordon, "Southeast Asian Refugee Migration," 156.

35

Chart 293

93

Robinson, Terms of Refuge, 295.

36

Appendix B
94

Chart 3

US Refugee and Special Immigrant Visa Admissions from Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria,
2002-2018
Yearly Total
Fiscal
(Refugee
Yearly Total
Year
Afghanistan
Iraq
Syria
Only)
(Refugee+SIV)
Refugee SIV* Refugee SIV*
2002
1,683
1,683
1,683
2003
1,453
298
1,751
1,751
2004
959
66
1,025
1,025
2005
902
198
1,100
1,100
2006
651
202
853
853
2007
441
1,608
2,049
2,049
2008
576
228
13,822
538
14,398
15,164
2009
349
775
18,838 1,557
19,187
21,519
2010
515
108
18,016 2,000
18,531
20,639
2011
428
101
9,388
618
29
9,845
10,564
2012
481
109
12,163 3,203
31
12,675
15,987
2013
661
442
19,488 1,460
36
20,185
22,087
2014
753 7,156
19,769 3,084
105
20,627
30,867
2015
910 6,336
12,676
890 1,682
15,268
22,494
2016
2,737 10,220
9,880 2,049 12,587
25,204
37,473
2017
1,311 16,866
6,886 2,455 6,557
14,754
34,075
2018
137 6,829
85
313
35
257
7,399
Totals
14,947 49,170 143,383 18,167 21,062
179,392
246,729

Refugee numbers as of January 31, 2018.
SIV numbers as of February 26, 2018.
*Special Immigrant Visa
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Compiled by the author from the following sources:

United States Department of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration, Refugee Processing
Center, Refugee Admissions Report January 31, 2018, January 31, 2018, Accessed February 26, 2018.
United States Department of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration, Refugee Processing
Center, Cumulative Arrivals by State for Refugee and SIV - Afghan FY07 -FY17 as of February 26, 2018,
February 26, 2018, Accessed February 26, 2018.
United States Department of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration, Refugee Processing
Center, Cumulative Arrivals by State for Refugee and SIV - Iraqi FY07 -FY17 as of February 26, 2018,
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